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The development of systems engineering and In these projects, essentially all of the tech-
program management in NASA manned nical responsibility was delegated to one of
space programs has grown in a largely un-
coordinated manner over the last 30 years.
However, the systems and practices that
have been developed form a proven pattern
for successfully integrating large, technical-
ly complex programs executed in several geo-
graphical locations. This development has
not been recorded in a comprehensive man-
ner, and much of the reasoning behind the
decisions made is not obvious.
For the purposes of this discussion, sys-
tems engineering is defined as the inter-
disciplinary engineering that is necessary to
achieve efficient definition and integration
of program elements in a manner that meets
the system-level requirements. Integration
is defined as the activity necessary to de-
velop and document the systems' technical
characteristics, including interface control
requirements, resource reporting and analy-
sis, system verification requirements and
plans, and integration of the system
elements into the program operational
scenario.
This paper discusses the history of SE&I
management of the overall program archi-
tecture, organizational structure and the
relationship of SE&I to other program orga-
nizational elements. A brief discussion of the
method of executing the SE&I process, a
summary of some of the major lessons
learned, and identification of things that
have proven successful are included.
HISTORY
NASA, then the National Advisory Commit-
tee for Aeronautics (NACA), participation in
the management of major aerospace pro-
grams began shortly after World War II with
the advent of the X series research aircraft.
the Centers, which were primarily expert in
the technical area being explored (i.e., aero-
dynamics, stability, control and structures)
but did not have experts in the development
of hardware. Accordingly, NACA entered
into agreements with the Air Force or Navy
to manage the actual development of the
aircraft. The NACA Centers focused their
direction on the technical requirements and
performance characteristics to be demon-
strated by the aircraft. The contractor's
responsibility was similar to that for the
development of any aircraft, and the contrac-
tor usually furnished test pilots for early
demonstration flights.
With the formation of NASA and the
start of major manned space programs, it
was necessary for NASA to develop the capa-
bility to manage complex development
activities. Very little SE&I capability exist-
ed within the functional organizations of the
NASA Centers. As a result, SE&I expertise
was developed within each of the program
offices. In particular, the Gemini program
office was set up with autonomous capability
to manage SE&I and direct the development
contractor.
With the advent of the Apollo program,
SE&I was again managed from the project
offices at the development centers. The
project offices used specialized technical
capability from the Center functional orga-
nizations and prime contractors and initiat-
ed the practice of hiring support contractors
to assist in implementing SE&I. After the
Apollo I fire, a review committee was estab-
lished to determine the cause of the fire and
recommend modifications to the program.
One of the recommendations made was that
NASA acquire a technical integration and
engineering support contractor to assist in
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accomplishing SE&I activity. The Washing-
ton program office selected Boeing as the
contractor and managed the contract for this
activity; however, a large portion of the work
force was located at the Centers. The con-
tractor's responsibilities included moni-
toring the development and operational
activities at the Centers, forming integrated
assessments of the activity, and making
recommendations to the program director for
improvements. As the program matured, the
contrac t. focus was changed, and the contrac-
tor provided a significant number of person-
nel to directly support the Centers in SE&I
and systems development activities.
With the initiation of the Space Shuttle
program and the adoption of the Lead Center
concept, it was decided to manage the Level
II integration activity, including SE&I, by
providing a small management core within
the program office and using many of the
Centers' functional organizations to provide
technical support in a matrix fashion. At the
Johnson Space Center (JSC), the lead person
from the functional organization was gener-
ally a branch head or an assistant division
chief. JSC had a relatively large staff to
draw from to provide the specific technical
expertise and the level of effort needed to
accomplish a given task.
The Space Station Freedom program was
started using the Space Shuttle program as a
model. As the Lead Center, JSC managed in-
tegration. Later, the Level II function was
moved near Washington, D.C., under the
deputy program director, and an indepen-
dent contractor was brought in to assist the
integration process. The Space Station Free-
dom management organization will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section.
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A single NASA Center largelymanaged ear-
ly NASA manned space flight programs,
which allowed for a relatively simple organi-
zational structure to accomplish program
integration. JSC, then called the Manned
Space Center, managed both development
and flight operational aspects of the Mercury
and Gemini programs with the checkout and
preflight testing being performed by support
elements at Cape Canaveral.
Apollo became organizationally more
complex (Figure 1). The spacecraft develop-
ment was managed by JSC, the launch vehi-
cle development by Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC), the prelaunch activities by
Kennedy Space Center (KSC)--by then an
independent NASA Center--and the flight
operations by JSC, In all of these programs,
the responsibility for the development of the
flight hardware was delegated to the
Centers, and the interfaces between projects
were intentionally kept as simple as possi-
ble. The Washington office, under direction
of the program director, was responsible for
overall direction of the program including
budgetary allocations, congressional rela-
tions, and management of development
issues between the project offices at the
different Centers. The actual integration
activity (SE&I) was coordinated by a series
of panels and working groups in which
individuals from the Washington program
office served as either chairperson or
members, with the program director over-
seeing the activity. In the early programs
(Mercury and Gemini), this activity was the
responsibility of a single Center, and the
Washington office was coordinated in an
informal manner, but by the end of the
Apollo program, the management of the pan-
el and working group activity was relatively
formal. In all of these programs the Center
directors took an active part and personally
felt responsible for the technical excellence
of the work performed by their Centers. This
intercenter involvement was accomplished
primarily through the management council
and major program reviews where Center
directors personally participated in major
decisions.
In part of the Apollo program, the
Washington office retained the responsibil-
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Figure 1 Apollo Program Management Organization
performing the SE&I activity with the actu-
al work being led by Bellcom, a division of
Bell Laboratories. Ultimately, this approach
was abandoned, at least partly because much
of the Center director's responsibility was
lost, and an adversarial relationship be-
tween the program director and the Center
organizations developed. The execution of
the SE&I was returned to the Centers with
management and coordination of intercenter
activities achieved through the use of work-
ing groups, panels and management re-
views.
At the outset of the Space Shuttle pro-
gram (Figure 2), the management of SE&I
was markedly changed. Some of the more im-
portant changes were adoption of the Lead
Center management concept in which one of
the participating Centers was delegated the
management of program level integration
including SE&I activities; the adoption of a
configuration with functional and physical
interfaces of much greater complexity; and
the employment of one of the major hard-
ware development contractors as the inte-
gration support contractor. The complex
interfaces made SE&I activity voluminous
and involved and required the commitment
of a larger percentage of the program re-
sources to this activity.
The Space Station Freedom program was
structured so that the interface activity
between the work packages was even more
complex than that of the Shuttle program.
Initially, the Lead Center approach to SE&I
activity was adopted, but the implementa-
tion was not effective. As a result of recom-
mendations made by study groups and the
committee reviewing the Challenger acci-
dent, it was decided to transfer the responsi-
bility for program integration activity,
including SE&I, to the deputy program
director in Reston, Virginia, and to bring on
a contractor to provide program integration
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Figure 2 Space ShuttleProgram Management Organization
support (Figure 3). Contractors having sig-
nificant hardware development contracts
were excluded from the contract competition.
The first approach was to provide detailed
management of SE&I activity by the Reston
civil service personnel with the integration
contractor providing support in executing
the activity. Additionally, it was thought
that much of the technical integration could
be accomplished by having the work package
contractors negotiate the definition and
execution of much of the detailed integration
process directly between themselves. This
proved ineffective, however, because there
was no clear lead responsibility and no clear
way to resolve differences. As a result,
because of the complexity of program in-
tegration and the lack of in-depth backup ca-
pability, this management approach has not
been completely effective.
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Figure 3 Space Station Freedom Program Management Organization (1990)
Recently, it was decided to give the inte-
gration support contractor direct responsibil-
ity for the integration of the program but
without authority to directly manage the
work packages or their contractors. In an
attempt to obtain more in-depth capability,
the program director and deputy program
director decided to execute the systems in-
tegration portion of the SE&I activity at two
of the Centers with the deputy director for
integration physically located at one of the
Centers. Since these functions were still re-
tained organizationally within the program
office, they were under the control of the dep-
uty program director and, at the same time,
had the advantage of drawing from the in-
depth technical capability residing at the
Centers. Simultaneously, the integrating
contractor's work force at the Centers was
increased in both responsibilities and num-
bers.
GROWING PROGRAM COMPLEXITY
One of the major factors determining the
efficiency of the integration of a program is
the methodology used to delegate the engi-
neering and development responsibilities to
the project offices at the Centers. It has been
found that less complex organizational
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structures and simple interfaces are ex-
tremely important to allow efficient manage-
ment of SE&I activities. Each of NASA's
manned space programs has been organiza-
tionally more complex than its predecessor
and has had more complex interfaces. In both
the Mercury and Gemini programs, the
flight elements were divided into two parts,
spacecraft and launch vehicle, and the phys-
ical and functional interfaces between the
two were quite simple. The induced environ-
mental interfaces were somewhat more com-
plex but readily amenable to experimental
and analytical determination.
The Apollo program involved a major in-
crease in program complexity. The space-
craft was divided into two project offices and
the launch vehicle was divided into four
project offices. By assigning the four launch
vehicle projects to the same Center (MSFC),
the integration between launch vehicle
stages could be accomplished at the Center
level. Similarly, both spacecraft projects
were assigned to one center (JSC) for the
same reason. The physical and functional in-
terfaces between the spacecraft and launch
vehicle, and hence between Centers, was rel-
atively simple. In a 1971 paper titled "What
Made Apollo a Success," George Low stated:
"Another important design rule, which we
have not discussed as often as we should,
reads: minimize functional interfaces be-
tween complex pieces of hardware. Examples
in Apollo include the interfaces between the
spacecraft and launch vehicle and between
the command module and the lunar module.
Only some 100 wires link the Saturn launch
vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft, and most
of these have to do with the emergency detec-
tion system. The reason that this number
could not be even smaller is twofold: redun-
dant circuits are employed, and the electrical
power always comes from the module or
stage where a function is to be performed.
For example, the closing of relays in the
launch vehicle could, in an automatic abort
mode, fire the spacecraft escape motor. But
the electrical power to do this, by design,
originates in the spacecraft batteries. The
main point is that a single person can fully
understand this interface and can cope with
all the effects of a change on either side of the
interface. If there had been 10 times as many
wires, it probably would have taken a hun-
dred (or a thousand?) times as many people
to handle the interface." However, the oper-
ational complexity of the Apollo vehicle
demanded a more extensive integration
activity between the Centers and for the first
time posed the problem of accomplishing
detailed technical coordination between
Centers.
One of the basic tenets of the Space
Shuttle was to have an integrated vehicle
that would recover the most expensive ele-
ments of the system for reuse. This led to a
design concept that placed a great majority
of the electronics and major components of
the main propulsion systems in the orbiter.
This design concept led to very large
increases in interface complexity between
the program elements and, more important-
ly, between the Centers. For instance, the
number of electrical wires running between
the external tank and the orbiter was more
than an order of magnitude greater than
between the spacecraft and launch vehicle of
Apollo, and for the first time, major fluid
systems ran across the interfaces. This
represented a formidable increase in the ef-
fort required to successfully accomplish the
SE&I activity. As previously noted, a new
program management structure (Figure 1)
was adopted to accommodate the increase.
The accomplishment of program-level SE&I
was given to a "Lead Center." The program
director at Headquarters was still respon-
sible for program budgetary control, Con-
gressional relations and a technical staff
sufficient to assure that the program tech-
nical activity was being properly implement-
ed. At JSC, which was the Lead Center for
the Shuttle program, a Level II program
office was established totally separate from
the Level III orbiter project office located at
the same Center.
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The development of the flight hardware
was delegated to four project offices with the
orbiter office located at JSC, as mentioned
above, and the other three--the Space Shut-
tle main engine office, the external tank
office, and the solid rocket booster office--
located at MSFC. In addition to the hard-
ware development project offices, a pre-
launch processing office was formed at KSC.
All of the project offices reported to the Level
II program manager for all programmatic
direction except budget allocation, which
was retained by the program director at
Headquarters.
The SE&I activity was delegated to the
systems integration office located within the
JSC Level II office. The orbiter contractor,
Rockwell International, was selected to be
the integration support contractor, but to
increase objectivity, the integration activity
was made a separate exhibit to the contract
and technical direction was delegated to the
Level II systems integration office. The
MSFC Space Shuttle project office appointed
an integration manager to manage the
integration of the Marshall Space Shuttle
projects and to serve as the primary interface
to the Level II systems integration office.
The flight hardware developmental dele-
gation of the Space Station Freedom
program was formulated in an even more
complex manner (Figure 4). End-to-end
developmental responsibility for each of the
major functional systems was delegated to
one of four project offices called work pack-
age offices in the Space Station Freedom
program. Responsibility for assembling and
delivering the flight hardware was broken
down by launch elements, again assigned to
one of the work package offices. Each of these
launch elements incorporates components of
most of the distributed systems, neces-
sitating the transfer of an extremely large
number of hardware and software items
between work packages prior to their deliv-
ery to the Government. This resulted in
another major increase in the complexity of
the program-level SE&I process and directly
contributed to the difficulty of implementing
a satisfactory SE&I process in the Space
Station Freedom program.
Figure 4 Space Station Integration Job
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SE&I SCENARIO
As a program develops from concept to oper-
ational status, the characteristics of the
SE&I activity vary greatly. Early in the pro-
gram, conceptual SE&I is intimately in-
volved in defining systems that will meet the
overall program objectives and in evaluating
the relative merits of each. This is usually
accomplished in NASA manned programs by
the civil service organizations, often in con-
cert with Phase A/B contracts with industry.
After the general systems specification has
been developed and a detailed evaluation of
systems concepts has been completed, SE&I
provides a lead in the preparation of the pro-
curement specifications for the Phase C and
D activities and is usually directly involved
in the source selection process. After award
of the Phase C and D contracts and final
selection of the design approach chosen for
implementation, SE&I is responsible for pre-
paring system-level technical specifications,
which define the performance requirements
to be satisfied by each of the major program
elements. SE&I then develops the system
characterization process to be used (dis-
cussed in detail later) and starts an initial
analysis cycle. The results of this cycle are
extremely important in verifying the valid-
ity of the system technical specifications and
providing a technical basis for conducting
the Program Requirements Review (PRR).
After completion of the PRR and updating of
the technical specifications, SE&I starts the
definition of the interface control document
tree and the initial document drafts. An-
other system characterization cycle is start-
ed, based on the updated specifications and
the hardware and software concepts chosen
to assess the adequacy of the proposed pre-
liminary design approach.
By this time in the program, the ad hoc
organizational structure should be well in
place and functioning routinely. The commu-
nication and management overview provided
by this structure of working groups, panels
and reviews is central to accomplishing hori-
zontal integration among the project offices
and is discussed in more detail later.
In preparation for the preliminary design
review (PDR), SE&I defines the minimum
content required in the PDR data packages
and is responsible for preparing system-level
documents supporting the Integrated
System PDR. During the PDR process, SE&I
representatives participate in the project-
level reviews with particular emphasis on
the compliance of the project to the system-
level requirements. During the Integrated
System PDR, emphasis is placed on assuring
that the preliminary designs proposed by the
projects are compatible across the interfaces
and that the integrated system is capable of
meeting the operational requirements of the
program. The SE&I organization is inti-
mately involved with the evaluation and dis-
position of review item discrepancies (RIDs)
that are submitted during the review.
As a result of the PDR process, changes to
the requirements and modifications to the
preliminary design of the elements are incor-
porated. A new characterization cycle is then
initiated to evaluate the compatibility be-
tween the modified requirements and pro-
posed system capabilities. At this time, the
drafts of the interface control documents are
expanded and quantitative detail is added to
assure that the documents are mature
enough to become baseline requirements in
the program. This maturation process inevi-
tably results in the identification of physical
and functional disconnects among the ele-
ments and in a significant number of
changes to the baseline.
In a similar manner, the verification
plans of the elements and the integrated
system are refined and baselined. The
responsibility for executing the test and ana-
lysis required by the integrated system ver-
ification plan are delegated to appropriate
organizations that prepare detailed plans for
accomplishing the assigned portions of the
verification.
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Detailed mission operational scenarios
and timelines are prepared by the operations
organizations, and the operations and SE&I
organizations jointly conduct an analysis of
the system capabilities to support the sce-
narios. Concurrently, the acceptance test
and prelaunch operations requirements and
plans are prepared and delegated for execu-
tion.
In preparation for the critical design
review (CDR), another system characteriza-
tion cycle is performed, based upon the
detailed design of the elements. This cycle
typically uses mature models to synthesize
the hardware and software systems and also
incorporates the results of tests performed to
that time. SE&I participates in the conduct
of the CDR in a manner similar to that of the
PDR. After completion of the CDR, the
system requirements and design changes re-
sulting from the CDR are incorporated into
the documentation, and another complete or
partial system characterization cycle vali-
dates the decisions made during CDR.
After CDR, the primary activity of the
SE&I organization is to analyze test results
and conduct analysis to verify the capability
of the system that is being manufactured.
Particular emphasis is given to verifying the
interface characteristics of the elements as
defined by the interface control documents.
This activity directly supports the prepara-
tion for the design certification review
(DCR), and provides interface information
necessary to allow acceptance of the system
hardware and software by the Government.
The DCR is conducted similarly to the
PDR and CDR but addresses the as-built
hardware and software. Successful comple-
tion of the DCR certifies the acceptability of
the as-built elements and the ability to be
integrated into an overall system that will
satisfy the initial program operational re-
quirements. Final operational certification
of the system is obtained by a combination of
the DCR process and analysis of information
obtained during early flight operation of the
system.
The SE&I organization's participation
throughout the program development cycle
supports operational planning and real-time
operations. SE&I is the repository of corpo-
rate knowledge of the details of system
capability, which is vital to the effective and
efficient operation of the system.
RELATIONSHIP OF SE&I TO OTHER
PROGRAM FUNCTIONS
To effectively accomplish the SE&I task, the
SE&I management organization must main-
tain good communications and obtain the
support of other program office organiza-
tions. Some of the more important interac-
tions are discussed below.
Configuration Management. The in-
teraction between SE&I and configuration
management is particularly strong. As the
developers and keepers of the systems speci-
fications, SE&I has an interface with the
configuration management function that is
extremely active throughout the life of the
program. The SE&I office recommends the
baselining of the technical requirements as
they become sufficiently mature and then
serves as the office of primary responsibility
for defining and evaluating most of the pro-
posed changes to this baseline. The SE&I of-
rice, after proper coordination throughout
the integration function, also recommends
the processing of noncontroversial changes
outside of the formal control board meetings,
where appropriate. This significantly re-
duces the board's workload and conserves the
time of the key managers who are members
of the change control board. As significant is-
sues are referred to the board, SE&I presents
an analysis of the issues involved and makes
appropriate recommendations for action.
Program Control. SE&I supports the
program control function in the development
of program schedules and budgets. The key
to making this support effective is the use of
the SE&I logic networks and estimates of the
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manpower required to accomplish the activi-
ties. Because of SE&I's interdisciplinary
nature, SE&I can assist in planning activi-
ties in many areas of the program.
Early in the program, SE&I helps define
the content and schedule milestones of each
project to permit coherent development of
project-level schedules and cost estimates.
SE&I also provides program control with the
engineering master schedules (EMS) and
associated budget estimates for incorpora-
tion in the overall schedule and budget
system. SE&I also works with program
control in planning major program reviews;
provides technical leadership in conducting
the reviews; and frequently chairs the
screening groups and pre-boards.
Operations. In all of the NASA manned
space programs to date, the SE&I function
has been managed in an organization differ-
ent from the operations definition and plan-
ning function. Although this is undoubtedly
the best choice in the later phases of the pro-
gram, it may result in a less thorough incor-
poration of operational requirements in the
systems specifications and other SE&I pro-
ducts early in the program. It may be desir-
able to combine the management of SE&I
and operations in the same office early in the
program and then separating them later,
perhaps at the completion of the preliminary
design review. The stated reason for separat-
ing the functions in the past has been that
they serve as a check and balance on each
other; however, the separation also discon-
nects the detailed interfaces between the two
functions.
SR&QA. The interactions between SE&I
and the system reliability and quality assur-
ance (SR&QA) functions depend on how
responsibility for executing the program is
delegated. If a large part of the SR&QA
activity is accomplished within the SR&QA
organization, SE&I is used as a reservoir of
information or to perform specific tasks as
requested by SR&QA. However, if the
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SR&QA office is responsible for setting the
requirements for SR&QA activities and for
evaluating the outcomesmwhile other orga-
nizations are delegated the responsibility for
executing the work--then SR&QA must de-
fine and obtain baseline approval of task re-
quirements, monitor execution of the task by
SE&I, and evaluate the results to assure sat-
isfactory achievement.
The former mode of operation was exem-
plified during the early Apollo program, in
which the SR&QA activities were largely ac-
complished within the SR&QA office using
basic engineering information obtained from
SE&I and other program organizational
offices. Later in the Apollo program, the
second mode of execution was adopted; the
engineering offices, primarily SE&I, actual-
ly performed the work and made a first-level
analysis before formally transmitting the
results to SR&QA for authentication. This
latter method was considered more effective
primarily because problems and discrepan-
cies were often discovered by the originating
engineering office and corrected even before
the task was completed.
SE&I EXECUTION
Techniques developed in past NASA manned
programs have proven effective and have
become an integral part of implementing
SE&I activities. The following paragraphs
describe, in no particular order, some of the
most important techniques in planning and
implementing new programs.
Importance of SE&I Early in a Pro-
gram. In the early stages of complex
programs, comprehensive SE&I support
helps determine the architecture to be used
to delegate project responsibility. This is
accomplished by dividing the program into
the next lower level of management, the pro-
ject offices. The primary outputs are compre-
hensive and clear program requirement
specifications, identification of major pro-
grammatic interfaces, development of the ad
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hoc SE&I management structure, definition
of operating concepts, and preparation of
initial specifications for the hardware to be
delegated to each project office.
The SE&I organization is responsible for
managing technical integration both verti-
cally between different levels of the man-
agement organizations and horizontally
across the organizations at each level. To
efficiently achieve both dimensions of inte-
gration, it is necessary to develop logic
diagrams of the major SE&I activities to be
accomplished by each of the organizational
elements and then to determine the interre-
lations between them. By developing these
diagrams and playing them against different
organizational structures, it is possible to
evaluate the proposed organizations in
simple terms and easily define the inter-
actions between the organizational ele-
ments, thus helping to choose the most
efficient management structure. The impor-
tance of the logic diagrams will be discussed
later.
Development and Use of Ad hoc Inte-
gration Structure. To manage the defini-
tion and implementation of the SE&I
activities in manned space programs, NASA
has developed an effective ad hoc organiza-
tional structure. The structure consists of a
series of reviews, panels and working groups
that address the definition and management
of integration functions throughout the pro-
gram. Each organization has members who
represent all of the organizations interested
in the particular integration function being
managed. In the Space Station Freedom pro-
gram, the working group structure is formed
by technical disciplines and distributed
systems, such as Guidance, Navigation and
Control, Robotics, and Loads and Dynamics.
The panels are formed to address specific
programmatic management areas (i.e., as-
sembly requirements and sLage definition,
system design integration, and element de-
sign integration) that span a number of orga-
nizations. The reviews are formed to address
relatively broad program areas as shown in
Figure 5.
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Integration
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Integration
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Figure 5 Space Station Freedom Technical Review Structure (1990)
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Each organization is responsible for de-
veloping the integration plan in its area of
responsibility, monitoring the execution of
the tasks, identifying problem areas, and
either resolving them or submitting them to
the overall program management structure
for resolution. Although these organizations
by their nature do not perform work, the
members, by working back through their
functional organizations, greatly influence
the work being accomplished in their par-
ticular area of expertise. As rapport develops
between members, many potential problems
and issues are identified and resolved with-
out being referred to formal management
decision channels. In addition, the quality of
the work materially improves. This ad hoc
organizational structure also provides obvi-
ous places for program elements to present
any issue for deliberation and resolution. All
of the panels and working groups support
each review as needed, and submit their
open issues to the most appropriate review
for resolution.
The reviews address broad issues and
serve as a communication channel between
the panels and the working groups. Since the
reviews cover all of the panels and working
groups, they provide an excellent way of
assessing and recommending to manage-
ment the interdisciplinary priorities of the
program.
Chairpeople of the panels and working
groups are the most qualified individuals
available in a particular discipline. Only sec-
ondary consideration is given to selecting a
person from a specific organizational ele-
ment. As a result of their recognized stature,
the chairpeople provide leadership, which
makes their recommendations and decisions
more credible. The panels and working
groups also call in outside expertise when
needed, but such outside inputs are filtered
by the panels and working groups before
making a recommendation to the reviews or
other management organizations.
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Internal vs. Matrix SE&I Staffing. As
already noted, SE&I has been staffed and
accomplished in different ways in different
NASA manned programs. In the early
manned space programs, the personnel
required to accomplish the SE&I activity
were assigned directly to the program and
project offices. During the Apollo and Shut-
tle programs, the program office had only the
people necessary to manage the SE&I activ-
ity, and most of the work was accomplished
by technical experts assigned from the
Centers' functional organizations in a
matrix fashion. Although each method has
its advantages and disadvantages, the ma-
trix approach generally has more advan-
tages in that manpower can be increased or
decreased as needed by pulling support from
the matrix organizations without reassign-
ing the people involved. The primary disad-
vantage is that the leader of a particular
area does not report functionally to the pro-
gram or project office, which means that the
line of direction is not as strong. The
importance of this negative factor, however,
is inversely proportional to the working
relationship between the organizations. In
the Space Shuttle program, this relationship
and the matrix approach worked well. In
other programs, the relationship was not as
good and direction through the matrix was
less effective. On occasion, program man-
agement appointed all panel and working
group chairpeople from the program office
staff, giving less regard to the individual's
personal qualifications. This led to a marked
decrease in the stature of the ad hoc
structure, which then resulted in a lack of
support from the functional organizations
and a decrease in the quality of the integra-
tion activity and products. As in many areas
of SE&I, effective implementation relies
heavily on the quality of the leadership and
the maintenance of free and open communi-
cations among the organizations involved.
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Logic Networks. As the NASA manned
space programs have become increasingly
complex, it has become difficult to define the
specific content and tasks needed to accom-
plish the SE&I function. Central to the de-
velopment of a comprehensive SE&I plan is
the development of detailed logic networks,
which form the basis for planning, executing
and evaluating the SE&I activities.
As used in the Space Shuttle program,
logic networks covered all of the SE&I activi-
ties that had to be accomplished by all
elements of the program organization. Thus,
these networks were able to interrelate
SE&I activities both vertically and horizon-
tally throughout the program management
structure. The basic summary logic net-
works were developed for the entire program
duration, to identify all major activities
required as a function of time, and were
instrumental in developing cost and man-
power forecasts for the entire duration of the
program. Detailed logic networks were then
prepared for the near-term in the Shuttle
program for 12 months, identifying in
greater detail the specific activities to be
accomplished by each organizational ele-
ment during that period. The networks were
revised every six months to extend the detail
planning horizon; in addition, the summary
networks were reviewed and modified as
needed on an annual basis. The logic
networks were a primary input to the devel-
opment of the engineering master schedules
discussed in the next paragraph.
Engineering Master Schedules (EMS)
and Associated Dictionary. The activities
identified in the SE&I integration logic net-
works were then assigned to specific organi-
zations for execution and presented as a
schedule for each organization involved. By
using a numbering system for the activities,
the logic network and the schedule could be
easily correlated. The schedules allowed cost
and manpower estimates to be prepared for
each organization and provided an excellent
means of determining status and managing
activities in real time.
Associated with the EMS, a dictionary
was prepared with an entry for each activity.
Each entry identified all input information
required to allow the accomplishment of the
activity; described the contents of the pro-
ducts; and identified the primary user of
each product, the scheduled completion date,
and the person responsible for preparing the
product. The EMS and the dictionary were
the primary tools for defining and communi-
cating SE&I activities throughout the entire
program structure.
As would be expected, the content of the
EMS changes character over the life of the
program and accordingly, requires various
technical capabilities over time. Early in the
program, the design activities involve a
large number of trade studies and the devel-
opment of synthesis tools to be used in evalu-
ating the capabilities of the proposed design.
As the program matures and the design so-
lidifies, the activities become more involved
with exercising the system models, conduct-
ing tests and analyzing data. As the flight
phase approaches, the activities are pre-
dominated by operational considerations, in-
cluding the development of operational data
books, mission requirements, certification of
system readiness, and support of mission
planning and real-time mission operations.
System Characterization Process. A
major SE&I activity throughout the program
life span is the assessment of the capability
of the system to meet specified requirements.
In the NASA manned space program, this
has been accomplished in an analytic sense
by synthesizing the vehicle characteri-
zations in the form of either models or
simulations, and then developing detailed
performance characterizations by exercising
the models against selected mission time-
lines and significant mission events.
The methodology used to perform the sys-
tem synthesis is central to the development
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of the logic networks and schedules described
earlier. An examination of the system usual-
ly reveals scenarios useful in conducting the
overall system evaluation; after selecting
the most desirable scenario, it forms the nu-
cleus of the overall SE&I logic. In the Space
Shuttle program, the scenario chosen was (1)
develop the necessary models and simula-
tions; (2) determine the structural modal
characteristics; (3) determine the loads on
each of the system elements; and (4) perform
stress analysis of the system when subjected
to these loads. Using this scenario it was rel-
atively easy to define and interrelate the
SE&I activities of other disciplines, such as
GN&C, propulsion, and thermal, among
others. After defining all of the required ac-
tivities, a document was prepared to identify
the models to be used, and the mission events
to be analyzed and to define the configura-
tion to be used. The sequence described
above formed an analysis cycle of a specific
configuration subjected to specific operation-
al requirements. In the Shuttle program, it
was termed an integrated vehicle baseline
characterization cycle (IVBC). As previously
described in the SE&I scenario, several char-
acterization cycles are needed during the
program: as the program matures, the cycles
have additional synthesis detail, more de-
finitive configuration information, and bet-
ter operational information.
At the completion of each of the charac-
terizations cycles, system deficiencies are
identified and modifications to either the
system specifications or the requirements
are made. For program management pur-
poses, it is usually convenient to schedule
the completion of one of the characterization
cycles to occur just before each of the major
program-level review milestones.
Program Reviews. SE&I has a large
input to each of the program-level reviews,
such as system requirements review, pre-
liminary design review, critical designre-
view, design certification review, and flight
readiness reviews. As mentioned above, corn-
pletion of one of the system characterization
cycles is an excellent indicator of whether
the system design meets the specified
requirements. The engineering master
schedule gives a graphic representation of
whether the integration progress is being
achieved. Reports produced by the SE&I ac-
tivity, such as resource allocation status and
margins, interface control document status,
design reference mission maturity, and sys-
tem operational data books indicate the
maturity of the element participation in the
system-level SE&I process.
Design Reference Missions. Most of the
manned space programs had to be capable of
performing a relatively large number of di-
verse missions, and the specifications are
written to allow hardware and software sys-
tems and elements that are flexible enough
to satisfy all of the missions. For analytical
purposes, however, it is convenient to define
and adopt one or more design reference mis-
sions (DRMs) that stress all of the systems
capabilities to a significant extent. The
DRMs are used as the primary mission re-
quirements in the system characterization
cycles, and in evaluating the ability to meet
performance specifications. In addition to
evaluating the baselined configuration
against the DRMs, other specification
requirements are evaluated by the accom-
plishment of specific analyses or tests, as
necessary.
The DRMs also allow the user community
to evaluate whether the system is capable of
meeting specific user needs and whether
these needs are specifically in the system
specifications. The DRM is used by mission
planners to determine the system's capabil-
ity of performing any specific mission under
consideration.
Verification. Verification plays a major
role in program planning and in the ultimate
cost of the system. Although most of the
verification is delegated to projects, SE&I is
responsible for identifying the overall
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verification requirements and specific
system-level verification tests and simula-
tions, which frequently require specialized
facilities and significant amounts of system
hardware and software. Since these system-
level verification tests are frequently com-
plex and expensive, planning for them needs
to start very early in the program. The
system-level verification network is devel-
oped as an integral part of the program SE&I
logic networks and is baselined early in the
program.
Final verification of some system require-
ments can only be accomplished in the real
flight environment, and these are demon-
strated in early operations before final certi-
fication of system operational capability is
accomplished. It is also important to inte-
grate the system-level verification planning
and the operations planning to promote the
maximum synergism possible between sys-
tem verification and operational training.
In manned space programs, all of the
major system level verification tests have
been assigned to program or functional orga-
nizational elements other than SE&I for
implementation. This has helped to assure
that the management of SE&I can remain
objective in the evaluation of overall certifi-
cation adequacy.
DCR Process. One of the most signifi-
cant activities of SE&I its role in the certifi-
cation of the system design prior to the start
of the flight operations and then later, prior
to committing the system to operating
throughout the entire design envelope. SE&I
is instrumental in setting the overall re-
quirements for the DCR and is directly re-
sponsible for the system-level portion of the
review. This process becomes the final major
system characterization cycle, using a syn-
thesis of the as-built vehicle hardware and
software capabilities and results of tests and
analyses. DCR results also form the basis for
the system operational data books that are
used to plan and conduct the operational
phase of the program. The DCR requires that
all system requirements be evaluated
against all of the as-built system capabil-
ities, and where possible, the system mar-
gins are quantified to assist the operations
organization in planning and conducting
flight operations.
ICD Development. As the program
management organizational structure is
determined and responsibility for developing
hardware and software is delegated, it is nec-
essary to start the development of the
interface control document (ICD) tree, which
identifies each required ICD and the content
to be presented. As previously noted, the di-
vision of program activities to minimize the
number and complexity of interfaces has a
strong influence on the overall program cost
and the ability of the program to meet sched-
ules. The early development of strawman
ICD trees can greatly assist in optimizing
the overall program management structure.
As the program progresses and the system
configuration becomes better defined, the
content of each ICD is developed in more de-
tail and ICD working groups are formed to
quantify the environmental, physical, func-
tional and operational characteristics in
detail. In most manned programs, the ICDs
have been baselined at a relatively early
point in the program and have usually con-
tained a large number of TBDs (to be
determined). After baselining the ICDs,
working groups continue their work to arrive
at specific values for each of the TBDs and to
continually assess the adequacy of the ICDs
as the design matures.
The ICDs are primary documents at each
program review and provide a basis for eval-
uating the adequacy of the items being
reviewed to satisfactorily function as part of
the total system.
Program Management Organization-
al Structure. The efficiency of program
management is greatly influenced by the
organizational structure selected. Organi-
zational structures that are compact and
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simple promote effective program manage-
ment. Compactness is measured vertically
by the number of levels of the program man-
agement organization and horizontally by
the number of organizations at each level.
Each additional organizational element
significantly increases the manpower and
costs of achieving program integration, in-
cluding SE&I. If each organizational ele-
ment must interface with all others in the
program, the number of interfaces increases
rapidly as organizations are added. Adding
management levels increases the complexity
for delegating the execution of the program.
This factor was evident to the Augustine
Commission in their recent summary report
The Future of the U.S. Space Program, in
which they recommended that "multicenter
projects be avoided wherever possible, but
when this is not practical, a strong and inde-
pendent project office reporting to Headquar-
ters be established near the Center having
the principal share of the work for that
project; and that this project office have a
systems engineering staff and full budget
authority."
In addition to keeping the management
structure compact, it is also very important
to select an architecture that divides the
program into project offices, to enable simple
interfaces between projects and delegation
that is all-encompassing. All of the deliver-
able hardware assigned to a given project
should be the responsibility of that project to
design and manufacture. In all manned
programs prior to the Space Station, there
was little transfer of hardware and software
between projects--with one exception, that
being the development flight instrumenta-
tion in the Apollo program.
Early in Apollo, a decision was made to
establish a civil service project office to
develop, procure and deliver the specialized
development flight instrumentation to the
prime spacecrai_ contractors for installation
and integration in the early spacecraft.
Coordination of the large volume of interface
information required the development and
maintenance of the complex bilateral sched-
ules and support required. The complexity of
providing support after the transfer of the
instrumentation was a significant manage-
ment problem throughout the entire time
that the development flight instrument was
used. In the Space Station Freedom program,
considering the many hardware and soft-
ware items that must be passed between
work packages, it will be difficult to develop,
coordinate and maintain all of the interface
information required.
Objectivity In Management. To pro-
mote objectivity in managing SE&I, one of
the basic ground rules in the Shuttle pro-
gram was that the SE&I function would not
be responsible for the development of any
flight hardware or software products; thus,
they had no conflicting pressure to make
their development job easier at the expense
of another organization. It was found that
any bias, either perceived or real, immedi-
ately brings the objectivity of management
into question and rapidly destroys the confi-
dence between organizational elements.
Need for Good Communication. The
nature of SE&I is such that most of the pro-
gram elements and many other agency orga-
nizations are involved in the execution of
SE&I tasks. To facilitate accomplishment of
the work, the importance of free and open
communication cannot be overstressed. One
of the ways of accomplishing this is "to live
in a glass house." All decisions and, of equal
importance, the logic behind those decisions
must be communicated to all parties
involved if they are to understand their role
and how it fits into the overall picture. All
parties must feel that their inputs are in-
cluded in the decision-making process. This
openness, and the accompanying feeling of
vulnerability, is often not welcomed and
requires faith and confidence between the
organizations involved. The fact that mis-
takes will be made must be accepted, and all
organizations involved must constructively
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assist in correcting them. Frequent open
meetings of the ad hoc organizational ele-
ments described above have proven to be an
effective tool in developing rapport between
peers and communicating information and
decisions throughout the program structure.
As noted earlier, however, such meetings
become increasingly time-consuming and
expensive as the complexity of the organiza-
tional structure is increased.
Importance of Margins. At the time
programs are initiated, they are frequently
sold on the basis of optimistic estimates of
performance capability, cost and schedules.
This often results in reducing margins to low
levels at program initiation and solving
early program costs and schedule problems
by reducing weight, power and other re-
source margins. As a consequence, margins
are reduced to zero or negative values early
in the program, making it necessary to modi-
fy the program to either reduce requirements
or introduce program changes that will
reestablish positive margins. The recovery of
the margin inevitably leads to significantly
higher ultimate program costs in both
dollars and days. Minimum life cycle costs
are achieved by holding relatively large
margins early in the program and then
allowing them to be expended at a prudent
rate during the program life cycle.
THINGS THAT HAVE WORKED WELL
In the management of the manned space pro-
grams' SE&I activities, several approaches
have been particularly successful. Some of
the most important, have been discussed pre-
viously but are readdressed here because of
their assistance in the management of SE&I.
Ad hoc Organizations. The use of ad
hoc organizations to coordinate SE&I activi-
ties has proven to be a valuable tool. The
effectiveness of SE&I depends heavily on
good communications between organizations
and the assurance that all organizational
elements take a common approach to the
implementation of SE&I. This is difficult to
accomplish using the normal program office
organizations because they cannot directly
address inter-organizational communica-
tions and have difficulty managing across or-
ganizational lines. The ad hoc organizational
structure, on the other hand, is made up of
specialists from each of the affected organi-
zations, and their activities directly promote
inter-organizational communications. Using
this technique, technical peers can plan and
monitor the execution of specific SE&I ac-
tivities. When a resolution cannot be reached
within the ad hoc organization, the issue can
be referred to the proper program manage-
ment office for decision.
Standard Organization Structure
within the Program and Project Offices.
During the Apollo program, the program di-
rector decided to have all of the program
management offices at both Level II and
Level III adopt a standard organization
structure: five offices reported to the
program manager and the same five offices
reported to each project manager. This tech-
nique assured that the work breakdown
structure was similar for all offices, that
direct counterparts could be identified in
each of the offices, and that budget alloca-
tions flowed down in a uniform and predict-
able manner. All of these features resulted in
less cross-linking between organizations and
made the required program management
activity more rational and predictable.
Although the specific office structure chosen
would be different for each program, having
uniformity between the Level II and Level
III management offices should be considered
for future programs.
System Characterization Cycles. Con-
structing the SE&I plan and identifying the
required tasks is a very complex under-
taking in large programs. As previously
described, it is best to have a well-defined
core of activity that, when completed, will
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characterize the capability of the system to
meet the specified requirements. Analysis of
the results reveals deficiencies and allows
modifications to either the requirements or
the system design to be identified, thus as-
suring an adequate margin of performance.
Building on this core analysis cycle, it is rel-
atively easy to plan the other SE&I tasks in
a consistent manner, and create a complete
characterization of the system capability.
Matrix Management Organizational
Approach. The concept of staffing the
program management office with a small
number of people who serve as managers
only and then augmenting their capability
with personnel drawn from other Center or-
ganizations in a matrix fashion has signifi-
cant advantages. Manpower can be brought
in from the organizations only when it is
actually needed, and the technical composi-
tion can be changed over time to satisfy pro-
grammatic needs. The quantity of personnel
can be augmented to meet program needs,
i.e., during major program reviews; the per-
sonnel involved can be assured of a career
path in their parent organization; and the
individuals involved can continually replen-
ish their expertise by participating in the
R&D activities of their parent organization.
This mode of operation has been quite
successful and has demonstrated several
additional advantages, such as reducing fric-
tion and undesired competition between the
program office and Center functional organi-
zations, improving technical communica-
tions across programs being implemented
simultaneously, and providing an efficient
way of phasing the development program
into an operational role. In particular, the
assignment of program-level SE&I to a Lead
Center, coupled with the execution of this
assignment using Center functional organi-
zations in a matrix fashions, allows the pro-
gram to take advantage of both the quality
and quantity of technical expertise available
throughout the Center.
Use of a Prime Development Contrac-
tor to Provide SE&I Support. In the
Shuttle program, the SE&I support contrac-
tor was also the prime contractor for the de-
velopment of the Space Shuttle orbiter.
Although there was considerable concern
about the ability of the contractor to main-
tain objectivity in supporting SE&I, this con-
cern was reduced to an acceptable level by
separating the direction channels of the
development and integration activity both
within NASA and within the contractor's
organization. The support contract was also
set up with an award fee structure in which
SE&I was responsible for providing inputs
for the SE&I activities. There were many
advantages in this arrangement:
a) The integration personnel were familiar
with one of the major program elements
and did not need to become familiar with
that element or the general program
structure.
b) Technical experts could be made avail-
able for both activities as needed.
c) Many of the synthesis tools required by
both activities were similar, and fre-
quently one model could be used for both
purposes with only minor modifications.
d) Uniformity in approach assured ease of
comparison of results from both project-
level and program-level activities.
The management of SE&I in NASA man-
ned space programs has developed over the
last 30 years to satisfactorily integrate
relatively complex programs. Some of the
approaches and techniques described in this
paper may be helpful in integrating future
programs. Careful consideration of the
organizational structure and systems archi-
tecture at a start of a program has an
overriding effect on the effort required to
accomplish the SE&I activity.
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